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Prospects for Economic Stability in l\'1exico 
In 1978 the economy of Mexico began a period of rapid 
growtll, fueled by rising oil revenues, foreign loans and in-
vestments, and relative political stability. Mexican invest-
ment, consumption, and income rose at impressive rates. By 
the early 1980s, however, growth had faltered. Rural emi-
gration, rising inflation, and declining productivity were but 
a few of the problems involved in the major economic 
crisis in February 1982. Indeed, to many observers, the 
phenomenal oil revenues only exacerbated many of the 
long-standing problems facing Mexico. 
On November 10, 1982, the Mexican government an-
nounced an agreement with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) on a program to ease the nation's mounting 
foreign debt. Under this letter of intent, Mexico could 
receive a credit of up to $3.84 billion from the IMF during 
the next three years on the condition that the government 
reduce the deficit, raise taxes, and curb imports. An exami-
nation of the choices available to the Mexican government 
and their possible results indicates that if Mexico tries to 
meet only the narrowest goals outlined in the letter of in-
tent, crises will probably continue to occur in the future. 
If major tax reforms are enacted at the same time, however, 
Mexico could return to a pattern of growth. 
The recent slowdown in economic growth caused by 
Mexico's initial austerity measures has already affected the 
U.S. economy. For example, in 1982 exports from the 
United States to Mexico declined by nearly $6 billion from 
a year earlier. This decline resulted in an estimated loss of 
approximately l 50,000 jobs in the United States and had 
a major effect on the economic recovery that had been 
predicted for the third quarter of 1982. U.S. admiqistration 
economists have recently predicted that because of the debt 
problems of Mexico and other developing countries, the 
1983 trade deficit will be between $10 billion and $20 bil-
lion larger than it was in 1982-a loss equal to about 0.5 
percent of the nation's gross national product (GNP). 1 
The recent avalanche of major government policy ini-
tiatives published by the administration of Miguel de la 
Madrid has led many observers of the Mexican economy to 
look at 1983 with both caution and concern. On the one 
hand, they hope for a marked improvement in economic 
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performance, but, on the other hand, they are concerned 
that the economy will continue to be full of shocks and sur-
prises. Most likely, students of the economy in the coming 
year will closely watch economic trends-as opposed to 
day-to-day fluctuations-for some evidence of progress or 
deterioration in the economy. From the point of view of 
the U.S. businessman, a wide range of indicators should be 
examined to judge whether the policies of the de la Madrid 
administration can be effective in the short run and can at 
the same time lay the foundations for some form of long-
term economic growth. 
To identify some of the major macroeconomic variables 
that could be reliable indicators of the.country's medium-
term economic prospects, we developed indicators on the 
feasibility of the stabilization program suggested in the 
letter of intent. After developing a macroeconomic model 
of the Mexican economy, using the procedure of optimal 
control,2 we conducted several simulations of the economy 
that represented a different mix of policy options available 
to the Mexican government or modifications to the stabili-
zation program. 
Traditionally, the failure of Mexican economic growth 
has been analyzed from two different perspectives. Some 
observers believe that the country suffers from a number of 
structural problems, including a low-quality and untrained 
entrepreneurial labor force, an inefficient public sector, an 
undeveloped capital market, and an inelastic tax system. 
These observers believe that any solutions must be long 
term and require careful planning and a substantial alloca-
tion of resources to each sector of the economy. 3 
The other major approach (which is followed in this 
article) suggests. that, while long-term structural problems 
are important, Mexico's problems should be solved through 
some mix of fiscal and monetary policy with a major em-
phasis on tax reform.4 Thus, the current crisis, while seri-
ous, can be viewed as a temporary financial imbalance, and 
the solutions can be seen as short term. The prospects for 
future economic stability in Mexico would depend on the 
willingness and ability of the government to enact the 
necessary monetary and fiscal reforms. 5 
The Current Crisis 
Mexico's current economic problems can be tr.aced to . 
both external and internal factors. 6 Primary among the 
most recent external causes were a weakening of the world 
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market for oil and higher international interest rates. While 
oil exports are still important, they only amounted to $14 
billion in 1981, instead of the $20 billion anticipated by 
the government. 7 Furthermore, the increasing world in-
terest rates, combined with rising debt, drove the interest 
burden from $5.4 billion in 1980 to $8.2 billion in 1981. 
Internal policies adopted by the government tended to 
exacerbate the problem. While the country's ambitious 
growth policy resulted in an average growth in real income 
of 8.2 percent from 1978 to 1981, the long-term growth 
capacity of the economy was only about 6 percent. The 
result, as expected, was increased inflation. Because of an 
apparent unwillingness to reform the tax system, budget 
deficits had reached 16 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) by 1982. In addition, the authorities maintained a 
fixed exchange rate for most of 1977-1980 in spite of 23 
percent annual inflation. As a result of the overvalued 
exchange rate, exports (other than petroleum) stagnated. 
In February 1982, the Bank of Mexico withdrew from 
the dollar market and allowed the peso to float freely. The 
peso depreciated 30 percent immediately and then another 
18 percent in May 1982. At the same time, the government 
instituted a program of "self-discipline" styled after, but 
independent of, IMF programs. Some of the measures 
enacted included a reduction of the ratio of the deficit to 
GNP, price controls on certain basic and industrial prod-
ucts, limits on public-sector and private-sector imports, and 
nationalization of banks in September 1982. 
While well structured, the program was by and large 
unsuccessful, especially in the key area of public finance; 
the government was apparently unwilling to sacrifice gov-
ernment expenditures and limit further credit expansion. 
Unable to raise enough capital in financial markets, the 
government approached the IMF in the summer of 1982 
for a major loan. 
The letter of intent signed by the IMF and Mexico in 
November 1982 outlined a three-year economic adjustment 
program to reduce the size of the deficit, which was then at 
its highest level ever-16.5 percent of GDP. Specifically, the 
letter called for ratios of the deficit to GNP of 8.5 percent, 
5.5 percent, and 3.5 percent in 1983, 1984, and 1985-1987. 
This plan of action, of course, implies major cuts in public 
expenditures. In addition, the country made a specific 
commitment that the debt, then at approximately $60 
billion, would not increase by more than $5 billion in 
1983. The Mexican government 
to negative growth rates in the ewnomy during 1983 and 
perhaps beyond. 
Various Stabilization Programs 
The two main policy variables in tR.c model developed 
for our analysis are government investment (the chief 
instrument of fiscal policy) and credit extended by the 
Bank of Mexico to the government. In each simulation an 
objective was specified, and policies were evaluated in terms 
of the trade-<>ffs associated with their resultant growth 
paths over the 1982-1987 period.8 
The effectiveness of each stabilization program is mea-
sured by the value of seven economic variables: the average 
annual growth rates from 1982 to 1987 for private con-
sumption, private investment, total investment (private plus 
government investment in addition to inventory changes), 
and GDP; the 1987 external borrowing requirement (ex-
ports minus imports) in billions of 1975 pesos; the 1987 
rate of inflation; and the 1987 ratio of the deficit to GNP. 
The baseline scenario, the mildest option open to the 
government, assumes an economic status quo and no agree-
ment with the IMF; existing policies are extended and 
deficits are not controlled. The objective is to maximize 
real GNP by 1987 but at the same time to reduce the infla-
tion rate to 20 percent. Under this program the inflation 
rate is below 18 percent by 1987 and at the same time the 
ratio of the deficit to GNP is stabilized at approximately 
11.5 percent, but the external borrowing rate would reach 
84.1 billion pesos by 1987-clearly infeasible from Mexico's 
point of view (see table). 
The second program-that under the IMF letter of in-
tent program-is a fairly severe stabilization effort. The 
major constraints explicitly outlined by the November 
1982 letter of intent are that the ratio of the deficit to GNP 
must be fixed at 8.5 percent, 5.5 percent, and 3.5 percent 
for 1983, 1984, and 1985-1987. The letter of intent was 
interpreted to imply an inflation goal of less than 10 per-
cent by 1987 and government borrowing and Bank of 
Mexico credit limited to a 5 percent average annual increase 
between 1982 and 1987. Given these constraints, govern-
ment investment is reduced by the model to a level that still 
maximizes the real GDP in 1987. Strict adherence to the 
letter of intent would present the Mexican economy 
with a fairly severe shock. Despite a positive rate of growth 
initially rejected the fund's pro-
posal to remove exchange con-
trols, eliminate the three-tier 
Effect of Various Stabilization Programs 
on Selected Economic Variables 
exchange rate system, or raise 
domestic interest rates; but the 
government has now apparently 
agreed to a compromise on each 
point. Incremental movements 
towards the fund's position will 
be implemented over time. Many 
Mexicans, especially politicians, 
are concerned that the policies 
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for GDP and a 6 percent rate of inflation, both private and 
total investment would have negative growth rates over the 
period examined because the entire emphasis would be on 
reducing government expenditures to meet deficit targets. 
An alternative program open to the government is to 
introduce some form of tax reform concomitant with re-
ductions in government expenditures. Thus the burden of 
reaching specified deficit targets would be spread between 
Jess government spending and increases in tax revenues. 
Assuming that the authorities want to reform part of the 
tax structure, the second program outlined above was rerun 
with the additional constraint that government revenues 
were to increase at an average annual rate of 1 S percent 
between 1982 and 1987. Under this program private in-
vestment, total investment, and GDP would increase at 
average annual rates of 1.4 percent, 2.1 percent, and 4.2 
percent. The inflation rate would be reduced to Jess than 
4 percent. More importantly, however, external borrowing 
would decline to 27.3 billion pesos-an average annual 
decline of about 11 percent since 1981. Private consump-
tion would expand at an annual rate of 4.8 percent. 
Prognosis 
A common feature of any program will have to be the 
severe restriction of government expenditure levels. In 
addition, our results indicate that if the chosen program 
goes no further than meeting the basic provisions of the 
IMF letter of intent, then we can expect repetitions of the 
crises of 1971, 1976, and 1982. Government policy will 
continue to be characterized by stop-and-go measures, and 
real economic growth of the economy will not exceed 2 or 
3 percent annually. 
If, on the other hand, a major tax reform-which we re-
gard as feasible and Jong overdue-is enacted at the same 
time, then the economy should grow at between 6 and 7 
percent annually during the current presidency. Stability 
and the inflow of foreign investment capital depend criti-
cally on the ability and the willingness of the present gov-
ernment to increase taxes. If this is done, the inflation rate 
should decline to approximately the level in the United 
States. This development would result in a fixed exchange 
rate between the dollar and the peso, with the obvious im-
plications for trade with the United States and the rest of 
the world. • 
In addition to these macroeconomic factors, several 
other factors are worthy of mention in any discussion of 
the future course of Mexico. Primary among these is the 
relation of the government to the private sector in the de la 
Madrid administration. The president's handling of the 
debt-ridden state enterprises and the treatment of the na-
tionalized banks will determine whether the private sector 
plays a dynamic role in the future of Mexico or will only be 
represented in such sectors as agriculture and services. 
A policy, soon to be implemented, to remove many of 
the restrictions on direct foreign investment will have an 
important effect on future investor confidence in Mexico. 
This policy, together with other innovative and concrete 
steps, will be needed to overcome the Joss of investor 
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confidence as a result of the forced conversion of dollar 
bank accounts into pesos in October 1982. 
In addition, factors that are, by and large, outside the 
conti"ol of the Mexican government will affect the country's 
economy. First, if world oil prices weaken, the country 
will face added pressure to increase oil production despite 
budgetary and technical obstacles. Second, sh9uld U.S. 
interest rates increase, the cost of servicing the Mexican 
debt-estimated to increase by $700 million for every 1 
percent change in interest rates-will dramatically hinder 
the prospects for any form of recovery. Finally, develop-
ments in international financial markets will determine 
whether or not Mexico can obtain the new credit needed 
to keep its debt under control. The contributions of indus-
trialized countries to the IMF and other last-resort lending 
agencies, the indebted nations' ability to restructure their 
combined foreign debt, the financial soundness of major 
international commercial banks, and the need to recycle 
the declining amounts of world petrodollars will directly 
influence foreign credit flows to Mexico. 
Notes 
1. "IMF Austerity Prescriptions Could Be Hazardous," Business 
Week, February 21, 1983, p. 112. 
2. Optimal control is a technique whereby a goal is set for a future 
date (such as 1987, in this case) and different paths for getting there 
are examined, subject to constraints such as a given inflation rate, 
a fixed deficit-to-GNP ratio, and so on. 
3. Carlos Tello, La PoHtica economica en Mexico, I 970-76 (M~xico, 
D.F.: Siglo XXI, 1979); Nora Lustig, "Char.tcteristics of Mexican 
Economic Growth," Journal of Development Economics (1982), 
pp. 355-76; Clark Reynolds, The Mexican Ewnomy (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1970), and idem, "The Mexican Economy 
1982-1987: Key Issues, Policy Alternatives, and Implications for 
International Business," in Alice Lentz, ed., "Country Risk Analy-
sis: Mexico" (workshop report for the Comrcil of the Americas, 
New York, May 1982, mimeographed). 
4. Abel Beltran del Rio, "Mexico's Troubled Economy: Peso Prog-
nosis," Wharton Magazine (Winter 1977), pp. 55-56; idem, "Econo-
metric Forecasting for Mexico: An Anal}'Jis of Errors in Predic-
tion," in Jere Behrman and James A. Hanson, eds., Short Term 
Macroeconomic Policy in Latin America (Cznbridge, Mass.: Ballin-
ger Publishing Co., 1979); idem, "The Mexican Oil Syndrome: 
Early Symptoms, Preventive Efforts and Prugnosis," in Werner Baer 
and Malcolm Gillis, eds., Export Diversific.iion and the New Pro-
tectionism: The Experiences of Latin Amerita (Urbana-Champaign, 
Ill.: Bureau of Economic and Business ReSQl"ch, University of Illi-
nois, 1981), pp. 115-30; Robert Looney, Mexico's Economy: A 
Policy Analysis (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Pms, 1978). 
5. Leopoldo Solis, Economic Policy Refonn in Mexico: A Case 
Study for Developing Countries (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981). 
6. William R. Cline, "Mexico's Crisis, The World's Peril," Foreign 
Policy (Winter-Spring 1983), pp. 107-8. 
7. Basil Caplan, "Mexico-The World's New Biggest Borrower," The 
Banker (July 1982), p. 33. 
8. The model's exogenous variables were st at the following rates 
to reflect historical movements: an exchage rate e:· 90 pesos to 
the U.S. dollar, the rate of increase in the 111ude pc troleum index 
at 6 percent, growth of crude petroleum exports at 6 percent a 
year, growth of U.S. gross domestic produa at 2.5 percent a year, 
and growth of the U.S. consumer price illlfex at 6 percent a year. 
119 
